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For over 30 years, a word with apocalyptic implications invaded the social imaginary. 
Since the Revolution in Iran in 1979, the attention of the public and that of the scientists have 
been directed towards Islam and the fundamentalist movements. The phenomenon culminated 
with the events of September 11, 2001 and March 11, 2004 which showed the financial, logistic 
and military strength of international terrorism and the destructive effects it can have on the 
global society. 
After that, terrorism has intensified and diversified as a continuous spiral.  New terrorist 
organizations  appeared,  as  well  as  new  methods  of  action  and  new  forms  of  collaboration 
between these organizations that assist each other.  
This subject incites because of the singular way in which this phenomenon manifests 
itself and due to its strong implications on individual relations, national and international, at a 
social, political, and economic level and other issues. 
Since the media describe in detail each terrorist incident, there is a perception that the 
phenomenon is relatively easy to study. This journey is extremely risky, however, due to the 
numerous variables involved, which can move it in a direction different from that originally set. 
•  Do we fight enemies that we have invented or created?  
•  What is the dynamics of the violence leading terrorism and the fight against it?  
•  How do we explain Islam and Al Qaeda?  
•  In  this  confrontation  do  we  change  them  and  their  lifestyle  for  better  or  for 
worse? What kind of phenomenon is terrorism?  
•  What problems and conflicts cause and sustain it?  
•  What allows it to extend to such a large scale? 
Terrorism first of all frightens.  Its acts are considered monstrous in scope and in size. 
Moreover, the number of road accident victims, of natural disasters and pandemics exceeds the 
number  of  victims  of  terrorism.  And  yet,  terrorism  induces  profound  changes  in  society, 
incommensurable with the acts themselves. Secondly, terrorists are considered monsters, lunatic, 
human pathology. But in the media we have situations where they recruit ordinary people and 
more, turn to ethical considerations, such as injustice, the attack against their own families and 
the society they belong to in order to justify their actions. Also, the only thing that attracts our 
attention is the criminal nature of the terrorist acts, although it is difficult to call them so because 
they amount to more than committing criminal acts, and the impact of their actions is much 
higher. 
In this article we intend to point a number of issues to be considered in any approach to 
understanding the phenomenon of terror carried out both at specialists and the general public. In 
this regard, in the first part of the article we identify a number of difficulties arising in the intent 
of  catching  the  meaning  of  the  concept  of  “international  terrorism”.  Next  we  examine  the 
analytical and empirical problems that arise in this approach from a critical perspective. We 
conclude  by  presenting  the  contributions  brought  by  the  sociological  research  to  the 
understanding of the terrorist phenomenon. 
 
 
 Conceptual challenges 
A hypothesis on the nature of terrorism should give solutions to the problems that the 
phenomenon involved, not to mention any of them. If we start from the idea that terrorism is a 
particular form of crime, the question arises: Why and when crimes take the form of terrorism? 
We appreciate that the difference between crime and a terrorist act lies not in the reason, the 
means  used,  the  nature  of  the  victims  or  the  effects  of  its  actions.  The  difference  lies  in  a 
mechanism  that  turns  murder  into  “something  else”.  Crime  becomes  a  terrorist  act  by  a 
transformation mechanism. This mechanism metamorphoses terrorist actions from acts of murder 
to morally laudable acts. The crime is reconfigured in a morally praiseworthy act and the criminal 
becomes a hero or a saint. 
Therefore,  we  hold  that  terrorism  is  a  “transubstantiated”  crime.
1  The  hypothesis 
mentioned above should be extended to the identification of the difficulties arising in the concept 
and  to the explanation  of  the transubstantiation  mechanism.  First,  the  attempt  to capture  the 
significance of this concept traps all those who are preparing for this journey. Etymologically, the 
term “terrorism” is derived from the word “terror”, expressing “a state of fear that frightens, 
disturbs and even paralyzes.”
2 In our attempt to avoid any confusion, we intend to show that 
“terror”  and  “terrorism”  are  not  synonyms.  While  an  act  of  terror  that  occurs  does  not 
automatically  lead  to  terrorism  and  expresses  a  psychological  phenomenon,  terrorism  is 
intrinsically  linked  to  terror  because  it  seeks  to  break  certain  psychological  and  emotional 
mechanisms. Terrorism affects both individuals and society in many aspects of economic, social, 
psychological and political nature.  
The claim that terrorism is a contested concept has already become a cliché. This is one 
of the most controversial concepts in the political lexicon whether it is viewed as a subjective 
process, as a moral judgement or as a war of words. The ambivalent nature of terrorism is not a 
discovery of the 21st century. The political concept of “terror” was first articulated with reference 
to the “terror regime” (1793-1794) practiced by the French Government. Paradoxically, terrorism 
was associated with ideals of virtue. Thus, the revolutionary M. Robespierre calls for the virtue 
without  which  terror  is  evil  and  terror  “without  which  virtue  is  powerless”  and  proclaimed: 
“Terror means justice, it is prompt, severe and inflexible, and therefore it derives from virtue”.
3 In 
the 19th century, the term identified leftist groups (anarchists, socialists, trade unions) considered 
a  challenge  to  the  capitalist  order.  For  example,  the  Russian  revolutionary  organization 
Narodnaya  Volya  (People's  Will,  January  1878  -  March  1881)  was  considered  not  only  a 
challenge  to  the  tsarist  regime,  but  a  global  movement  that  threatened  the  entire  global 
civilization: 
“Exactly 100 years ago I heard the same call. An anarchist assassinated in September 
1901 President William McKinley, which prompted the new President Theodore Roosevelt to call 
on a global crusade to exterminate terrorism ... ‘Anarchy is a crime against humanity and all 
should unite against anarchism. Its crimes should be regarded as crimes against the standards 
established by treaties between civilized powers’.”
4 
The meaning of the word has changed in the 1930s, when it was less used to refer to 
revolutionary  movements  and  more  to  describe  the  practice  of  mass  repression  used  by 
totalitarian countries and by the dictators, against citizens. A similar transformation occurred 
                                                 
1 S. N. Balagangadhara; J. De Roover, 2009, “The Saint, The Criminal and The Terrorist”, The Journal of 
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Hall. during the Cold War when the leftist groups and progressive movements of national liberation 
were considered terrorist or representatives of the Soviet Union. 
The  recent  definition  formulated  by  the  U.S.  State  Department  aimed  at  “terrorism  as 
violence premeditated, politically motivated, directed against non-combatant targets by subnational 
groups or clandestine state agencies, with the purpose of influencing the public.” Such attempts to 
characterize terrorism as the unlawful use of force or violence by subnational groups and non-state 
actors against non-combatant targets, in order to intimidate or coerce a government or civilian 
population to achieve political or social objectives, capture many features of the phenomenon, but 
fail as assumptions of the distinct nature of the phenomenon.  
A number of similar acts come to support this idea: the massacres committed by the 
Nijvel  groups  in  Belgium  in  1982-1985,  the  armed  attack  in  Washington  DC  in  2002,  the 
massacre at Virginia Tech in 2007, when a South-Korean student killed 33 people on campus and 
many others. 
Therefore, given the uncertain ontological status, the need to determine what legitimizes 
an act as violence or not, what a political purpose means, which are the real intentions of a 
clandestine person, how can innocence be measured, all these introduce a subjectivity field in the 
discursive field. Thus, we can say that, in practice, what leads an action to be considered terrorist 
violence are not the inherent features of the violence itself, but a private group that provides 
political and cultural legitimacy. According to the researchers A. Schmid and A. Yongman: “The 
nature of terrorism is not inherent in the violent act itself. The same act [... ] may be  terrorist or 
not, depending on the intent and circumstances.”
5 Terrorism is therefore a social fact, rather than 
a crude reality, whose political and cultural significance is determined by a symbolic name, a 
social agreement and a wide range of intersubjective practices. 
The problem now is whether terrorism should be tackled through the violent nature of the 
acts or the nature of the actors who commit these acts. Many researchers in the field follow the 
practice of the States and that of the international organizations in addressing terrorism, solely 
from the perspective of this phenomenon as violence of non-state actors, preferring to use the 
name of “repression” for similar actions of states. On the other hand in an objective interpretation 
of the characteristics of violence committed by states, they can and sometimes do commit state 
terrorism, but the topic is avoided in their work by the phenomenon’s researchers. In this regard, 
William Laquer says that states made more victims and caused greater damage than the other type 
of terrorism, but does not study this issue.
6 
 
The mechanism of transubstantiation  
Asserting that the mechanism of terrorism transforms crime into morally exemplary acts, 
leads to the question: How does terrorism transform crime into examples of morality? A possible 
answer would be that terrorism makes every criminal action a sui generis act, which cannot be 
compared to other acts. Crime is transubstantiated   in “acts taken to the duty’s limit”.
7 They are 
not mandatory, and the failure of such actions would not make the person that has committed 
them an immoral. Moreover, terrorism mechanism calls for a moral community, for its moral and 
ethical concepts and uses the existing distinctions between good-bad, right-wrong, moral and 
immoral, etc. Relying on this distinction they systematically reconsider the immoral elements of 
their acts, representing them as facts situated at the duty’s limit. 
The community should therefore judge as moral and at the same time at the duty’s limit 
acts  which  are  actually  immoral  and  criminal.  Community  should  therefore  appreciate  the 
intellectual and moral position one and the same act at the same time, immoral and at the debt limit. 
                                                 
5 Idem, 1988, Political Terrorism:A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Databases, Theories and 
Literature,  Oxford: North Holland, p. 101. 
6  W. Laqueur, 1979, Terrorism, Boston: Little Brown, p. 6. 
7 D. Heyd, 1982, Supererogation: Its Status in Ethical Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Therefore, the mechanism turns people into criminals or moral saints of the community to which 
they belong. But this is practically impossible: from the same point of view, an act can’t be both 
immoral and at the duty’s limit. If a moral community would accept this, it would disintegrate and 
would cease to exist. In conclusion, we can say that terrorism undermines the foundations of its 
original community, turns against it and even destroys it. 
How does the terrorist resolve the tension between him and his moral community? This 
problem of inconsistency between what he is doing and its moral fundamentals is transformed 
into an external opposition between the empirical community to which he is attached at a certain 
moment (and which becomes the relevant moral community for him) and the rest of the world: 
the external opposition between “us the moral” and “them the immoral”. 
 
Analytical and empirical issues 
Closely  related  to  the  subversive  nature  of  terrorism  is  the  trans-evaluation  of  the 
language.
8 Terrorists define themselves as “martyrs”, “freedom fighters” who engage in “battles” 
and “self-defense operations” in which they execute the “enemies of the people.” Criticism in 
recent studies is that this self-defining was accepted both by the supporters and especially by the 
opponents of terrorism. Terrorists are treated as special people with special status, different from 
ordinary criminals, which does nothing but encourage them further in their actions. A subversion 
is thus produced by the subversion of their moral and legal codes. By the endless debate on the 
question whether some religions or political theories encourages terrorism or not, we accept the 
legitimacy of the terrorist argument. 
By identifying terrorists as “religious” or “fundamentalists” we  simply to adopt their 
own description, that, to the detriment of our  fundamental notions of human rights and in favor 
of  discrimination between people of other “religions” or regions, rather than distinguish between 
good-bad, moral and immoral, etc. We agree with them and always talk about “terrorist acts”, 
rather than say that they are in fact criminal acts. Another criticism of approaches designed to 
understand terrorism refers to the over-dimensioning of the terrorism. The identification of the 
way the social construction of the terrorist threat is realized and the identification of the political 
economy that produces it, is an important objective of our work. 
The question that occurs is why and by who is the terrorist threat over dimensioned? 
A number of authors argue that the larger purpose is to show that terrorism is so strong 
(armed conflict is justified as a preventive measure) and threatening (possession of weapons of 
mass destruction) that there is no other solution than the reaction force.
9 Peter Bruck in his “Crisis 
as Specular: Tabloid News and the Politics of Outrage” used the term “spectacular” to describe 
periods of crisis in society in which violence show was used to validate the fears of consumers of 
media,    programming  their  feelings  in  times  of  political  uncertainty.  Extrapolating,  we  can 
formulate the idea that the fears generated by terrorism are examples of false consciousness of the 
public and can be understood as the self-created agenda of government agencies. The tendency of 
exaggerating the terrorist threat is an indicator of the moral and social panic deliberately created to 
justify the actions of the states. 
Another perspective on this dilemma was expressed by Robert Goodin in his “What's 
wrong with terrorism” in which he advances the idea of the existence within the public opinion of 
a wrong perception of “politics of fear”
10. Specifically, while the media uses that fear to build 
scenarios  and  media  events,  political  elites  manipulate  this  fear  for  social  control  and  the 
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10 R. Goodin, 2006, What’s Wrong with Terrorism?, Cambridge: Polity Press. development of partisan economic and social interests. The author argues that social fear not 
occur naturally, but deliberately created and supported by powerful systemic forces for profit, 
prestige,  self-seeking.  Along  with  the  military,  there  are  listed  other  actors  interested  in 
maintaining  and  over-dimensioning  of  the  terrorist  threat:  pharmaceutical  companies,  private 
security firms, local councils and politicians to invest in monitoring services and even journalists, 
commentators, experts who construct their prestigious careers. 
The idea that appears is that of a symbiotic relationship and, perhaps, an unconscious 
form of coordination between terrorism and counterterrorism. All these actors involved are held 
responsible for the moral evil of terrorism. This situation requires what anthropologists would call 
“The exorcism of demonic power of the story of the terrorist threat.”
11 This view should not be 
ignored in our own research and on the contrary, it should be taken for analysis because it raises 
serious problems. 
Another criticism recently brought to the study of terrorist phenomenon relates to their 
foundation more on media and official sources, to the prejudice of the ethnographic research of 
the phenomenon in the ethnographic context of the knowledge of the societies these movements 
come from. Another hypothesis to be subjected to careful and rigorous analysis is the relationship 
between international terrorism and Muslim society. 
How contemporary or classical Islamic theology contribute to the meaning of terrorism as 
a modern Islamic movement? The answer to this question is extremely laborious, requiring many 
hours and many pages for his presentation. In the following we will stop only to a very brief 
statement of our point of view. Most of the new terrorist organizations are religiously motivated 
organizations, most of which are Islamic organizations. Since 1980, analysts have argued that 
Islam is suffering an identity crisis, the shift of the Islamic civilization to the Modernity leaving 
the Muslims with a deep sense of alienation and injustice. Muslims around the world talk about 
their company's decline. They know that something bad is happening, but do not know why. 
The creation of Pakistan and Israel, the expulsion of Palestinians, the  Revolution in Iran, 
the armed civil war in Algeria, Afghanistan, Central Asia has displaced and killed millions of 
people, divided communities and destroyed families. These events led to the siege mentality and a 
belligerent and highly polarized political discourse. A large percentage of refugees in the world 
come from the Muslim world. Fields of refugees are places that inspired the anger and despair. 
Among the many religious based terrorist groups, Islamic fundamentalism is highlighted by the 
use of extreme violence, thereby constituting a threat to all religions - Muslim, Christian, Jewish, 
Buddhist, Hindu. It aims at all costs to prevent the modernization and liberalization of the Muslim 
world. Most times even the Islamic countries’ populations are victims of terror and violence. 
The myth of preventing at all costs the modernization and liberalization of the Muslim 
world  where  democracy  is  more  pronounced  where  the  democracy  is  suffering,  or  in  closed 
societies, where traditional tyrannies (Saudi Arabia) or secular (Syria, Iran) take advantage of the 
lack of information and the credulity of the masses. All these are meant to build the image of 
America inhuman, mercantile, possessed by the god of money, and always aggressive imperialist. 
The anti-American myth proposes a scale of value opposite to the existing board and says it cannot 
accept the modernity. These perceptions shape a tradition of exclusion, which is justified by the 
myth of the warrior who defends an aggressed identity.  
Within  the  Muslim  world,  the  tension  began  with  the  seizure  of  power  in  Iran  by 
Ayatollah Khomeini (1979). He will send his message, supporting the return to Islam. 
The Pan-Islamic character of the Revolution will be introduced in the Iranian Constitution 
which states that all Muslims form one nation (Ummah) and that his regime has a duty to achieve 
the unity of Islamic nations: “Iran will support the revolution in all the Islamic countries.”
12 
                                                 
11 J. Zulaika, W. Douglass, 1996, Terror and Taboo: The Follies, Fables, and Faces of Terrorism, London: 
Routledge. 
12 W. Dietl, 1984, Holy War, NewYork: MacMillan, p. 281 Since the beginning of the Revolution, terrorism was considered a legitimate tool in the war 
declared by Islam against the West. It is held in the name of Allah, this justifying all forms of 
terrorism: “Terror strikes at the hearts of enemies, it is not only one end, it‘s the end itself.”
13The 
Islamic Revolution was doomed to failure because of rejection by the wider Muslim world to this 
branch  Islamic  Shia.  Values  of  Islam  reject  these  terrorist  acts  as  being  aggressive  and  not 
martyrdom. Islam is often the one who justifies suicidal terrorism, the religion is only excuse for the 
objectives. The concept of “religious terrorism” establishes a causal link between Islamic doctrine 
and terrorist violence, and outlines a vision of the threat of indiscriminate and excessive “Islam”. By 
locating sources of contemporary terrorism in religious extremism, rather than in response to the 
power  exerted  by  Western  powers,  the  speech  is  deflected  towards  de-politicizing,  de-
contextualizing and de-historicizing grievances and counter-hegemonic struggles. 
This concept of operation also worked for the representation of Muslims as a "suspect 
community",  to increase  Islamophobia  and  the  abuse  of Muslim  minorities  (Pakistan,  Egypt, 
China, Uzbekistan) and to undermine the dialogue to resolve the conflict. On the other hand, the 
counterterrorism discourse served to legitimize Islamic terrorism in many international projects: 
regime change in countries like Afghanistan and Iraq, the expansion of military presence in new 
regions such as Central Asia, the control of strategic resources (oil) and more. 
 
Attempts at sociological theorizing of terrorism 
A  trans-disciplinary  approach  to  the  phenomenon  of  international  terrorism  helps  us 
understand more clearly this phenomenon in terms of causes, intentions, how the event manifests, 
and its implications. The sociological approach supports the complete “picture” created before. 
To achieve this goal we will stop at a number of valuable researches of some authors who tried to 
theorize terrorism at a sociological level. Such research has been conducted by Charles Tilly
14 
who states that terrorism is an act with intent dominated by multiple sources and different degrees 
of coercion skills, without a causal coherence. Donald Black
15 argues that terrorism should be 
understood  as  a  “civil  self-helping”  expressed  in  the  form  of  violent  acts,  ordered  by  a 
constellation of multi-dimensional and structural forces. Starting from the theory of the collective 
action, Anthony Oberschall
16 states that terrorism should be seen as a form of collective action, 
coordinated across four dimensions: dissatisfaction, injustice based on doctrine, organizational 
capacity and political opportunities. Albert J. Bergesen and Omar Lizardo
17 provide a “globo-
logic” model of terrorism. 
Under this model, the international terrorism is a product of the global system dynamics, 
a  reaction  to  modernization,  industrialization  and  globalization,  based  on  the  following 
conditions:  hegemonic  decline  of  powerful  states,  globalization,  colonial  and  imperial 
competition and the origin of terrorist actions in semi -peripheral areas of the global system. 
Jeffrey  C.  Alexander
18  argues  that  terrorism  and  the  response  to  it  has  important  symbolic 
dimensions, to be understood in terms of the cultural codes’ structure. 
The conclusions of this research help us to shape a theory of terrorism. 
Anti-hegemonic Terrorism will be our concern below. 
                                                 
13 Ibidem, p. 290 
14  C.  Tilly,  2004,  “Terror,  Terrorism,  Terrorists”,  Sociological  Theory  22  (1):  5-13.- 
http://www3.interscience.wiley.com  (November, 15, 2009) 
15  D.  Black,  2004,  “The  Geometry  of  Terrorism”,  Sociological  Theory  22  (1):  14-25, 
http://www3.interscience.wiley.com (November, 15, 2009) 
16  A.  Oberschall,  2004,  “Explaining  Terrorism:  The  Contribution  of  Collective  Action  Theory”, 
Sociological Theory 22 (1): 26-37, http://www3.interscience.wiley.com (November, 15, 2009) 
17 A.J. Bergeson; O. Lizardo, 2004, “International Terrorism and the World-System”,  Sociological Theory 
22(1): 38-52, http://www3.interscience.wiley.com (November, 15,  2009) 
18 J. Alexander, 2004, “From the Depths of Despair: Performance, Counterperformance, and 'September 
11”, Sociological Theory 22 (1): 88-105, http://www3.interscience.wiley.com (November, 15, 2009) The idea of protecting the powerless from the evil is an essence of the concept of social 
justice. The oldest code of laws in human history, the Code of Hammurabi, shows that the role of 
the judiciary was to protect the powerless in society. It also includes the idea of control of the 
powerful in their relationship with the powerless. 
Therefore, the origins of terrorism and political violence are reflected in the unequal 
power  between  opposite  poles  in  their  fight  for  the  foundations  of  symbolic,  economic, 
ideological, political and social relations. The term “hegemony”, first used by Anthony Gramsci – 
“Letters from prison” (1955), was used in the analysis of ideological and cultural leadership 
imposed by the dominant interests of the society. According to him, the power of invisibility 
comes from its cultural hegemony, in contrast to the economic power; political or legislative are 
more  exposed.  When  hegemonic  power  is  exposed,  the  result  is  often  the  emergence  of 
movements that change anti-hegemonic dominant power bases. In light of these ideas, we can say 
that terrorism is a counter-hegemonic response to the control of a hegemonic power.  
The  anti-hegemonic  nature  of  terrorism  was  illustrated  by  “validating  ideologies” 
formulated  by  Mark  Juergensmeyer.
19  In  the  analysis  made  to  terrorism,  he  argues  that 
individuals involved in terrorist actions think that their actions their actions were supported not 
only by their followers, but also by the vision that already live in a violent world. Since their 
communities are under siege, their acts are nothing but a response to violence exerted on them. 
Since counter-hegemonic movements have no access to institutional resources and to the channels 
owned by hegemonic systems, they must find alternative, usually violent means to engage in the 
action of changing the existing power relations. 
Since these facilities are outside the societal systems, the validation of ideology helps 
mobilize the anti-hegemonic movements and the motivation to participate in illegitimate acts as 
the terrorist ones. Terrorist violence is motivated by doctrinal ideas regarding the fear of the 
increasing globalization and Westernization of the Arab world.  
Max Weber in his analysis of the “routine’s charisma” captures an endemic problem of 
the social issues. 
20This issue is based on the fact that the feelings of a group and its commitment 
to political leaders are not charismatic enough to support the sustainability of social movements. 
Weber argues that an emotional or charismatic group with fundamentals may have a strong and 
enthusiastic consistency, but such a combination is inevitably transient and requires high energy 
consumption to motivate and retain them. As the group increases or at the loss of the leader, other 
foundations have to be found to mobilize and ensure its cohesion. Weber talks about one of the 
most used strategies: institutionalization and streamlining formal group called the installation of 
the routine. But formal institutionalization often leads to increased dependency on resources, 
which  redirects  the  original  goals  of  social  movement.
21  Since  institutionalization  brings  the 
association and dependence of conventional political processes, the routine process encounters 
“an emotional spark” between the dominant interests and those of counterbalancing. 
The routine process comes to share social movement in two parts: those motivated by the 
convincing “spark” of the emotional effervescence, who fear the effects of institutionalization and 
the potential co-opt that might result and the those who have institutionalization as a target and 
leave behind the effervescent strategies (by protests, demonstrations, etc.) for fear that it would 
affect their legitimacy and access to resources. The paradox that exists between the emphasis on 
disruptive tactics, or the organizational routine can divide a movement and can do it even more 
aggressive. 
                                                 
19 M. Juergensmeyer, 2003, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence, Third 
Edition. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
20 M. Weber, 1978 [1921], Economy and Society, Volumes 1 and 2, Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 
21 F. F. Piven; R.A. Cloward, 1979, Poor People's Movements': Why They Succeed and How They Fail, 
NewYork: Vintage Books.  We  consider  that  terrorist  groups  are  strong  reactions  to  the  inefficiency  of  the 
institutionalization  of  anti-hegemonic  movements.  In  Weberian  language,  terrorist  groups  are 
components of charismatic social movements. They are often incited by an emotional reaction 
against the domination and against the perceived threats at way of life. Starting from another 
Weberian concept, the legitimacy of state, Randall Collins introduces the idea of the dynamics of 
“power-prestige”.
22 According to his conception of the legitimacy of state is a direct and positive 
function of the geopolitical level of the binomial power-prestige. All the states are part of an 
international  system,  in  which  the  high  military  power,  achieve  a  high  degree  of  prestige. 
Participation in international conflicts has important consequences on the binomial, and thus on 
its geopolitical legitimacy. Conflict is therefore a means by which a state can assert power and 
increase its prestige.     
Reported  to  the  model  of  state  legitimacy,  terrorism  represents  a  unique  situation. 
Although the victims of terrorist attacks gain the global community’s sympathy and legitimacy 
for the global community further action, the attacked state’s prestige and geo-political power are 
compromised because the attacks reflect its vulnerabilities. On the other side of the conflict, 
people who are successfully committing terrorist attacks obtain power-prestige because of the 
illegitimate  use  of  violence.  We  conclude  that  terrorist  attacks  want  to  draw  the  hegemonic 
power’s attention and to generate external legitimacy within the networks who share common 
interests.  
Another important concept for understanding the phenomenon of terrorism and to which 
we refer to is that of the dynamics of the rituals and their ability to produce social integration. We 
consider the central idea of solidarity theory developed by Emile Durkheim
23 that group life is 
organized  in  the  form  of  collective  representation  catalyzed  by  emotional  effervescences. 
Organizing groups at a high level of social cohesion is a direct function of social rituals that are 
the “cult” of the societies and that constitute not only the base of the religious life’s organization 
but also of the structure of group life in any society.
24 
The great sociologist builds his solidarity theory on two key concepts: “positive cult”, 
representing the system of cultural representations which outline the normative and behavioral 
code and “negative cult” including cultural taboos, prohibitions and requirements from which the 
people should abstain if they want to maintain the status of group members. While the positive 
cult  signifies  the  moral  force  of  the  group,  with  the  role  of  integration  and  mobilization  of 
individuals on the basis of common faith, the negative cult social forms the basis of the social 
sanctions and of the legal institutions of the group.  
The  E.  Durkheim's  theory  reveals  a  new  dimension  to  understanding  terrorism.  In 
addition to their violent nature, terrorist acts also include symbolic elements. These are violations 
of the cultural symbols of the attacked societies. In this sense, a terrorist strategy is effective to 
the extent that its targets have a significant symbolic value. A symbolic attack would not achieve 
the goals if it won’t undermine the symbolic foundations of the structure of his victims’ culture.  
As the language of the great sociologist reveals, terrorism is a ritual act that intentionally 
violates the negative structure of the cult of the attacked group and pursues weakening the group’s 
solidarity  by  compromising  its  sacred  values.  But  as  the events  have  shown,  a  terrorist  attack 
against the negative structure of worship contributes to strengthening the positive structure of the 
victimized group’s cult, strengthening its legitimacy and internal solidarity. The terrorist act actually 
meet two social functions: on the one hand it is a symbolic act that supports the solidarity and 
commitment among individuals who share interests and, on the other hand, increases solidarity 
among  those  affected.  The  result  is  polarized  into  two  warring  groups  with  higher  levels  of 
internalized solidarity and legitimacy. 
                                                 
22 R. Collins, 1986, Weberian Sociological Theory, New York: Cambridge University Press 
23 E. Durkheim, 2001, Diviziunea muncii sociale, Bucureşti: Editura Albatros 
24 Idem, Formele elementare ale vieţii religioase, 1995, Iaşi: Editura Polirom In conclusion we can say that the definitions and concepts of international terrorism are 
not  objective  and impartial,  but  “buildings”  that reflect the  ideas and,  more importantly,  the 
interests of those who elaborate it. As both a political and social process, terrorism is also a 
communication process. In this regard, Bruce Hoffman argues: “On a point, at least everyone 
agrees”: terrorism “is a pejorative term. It is a word that has intrinsic negative connotations, 
generally  applied  to  the  enemies  and  our  opponents  or  those  who  agree  or  not,  otherwise 
preferring  to  ignore  them...  Therefore,  the  decision  to  appoint  someone  or  an  organization 
‘terrorist’ is inevitably subjective, largely depending on the sympathy or antipathy shown to the 
person / group / their causes”.
25 
This idea is older, as expressed by anthropologist Sir Edmund Leach since 1977. Sir 
Edmund  Leach  was  among  the  first  scientists  who  criticized  the  abuse  carried  on  the  label 
“terrorist”. Starting from this idea, it was right to claim that the greatest threat to world peace 
today is terrorism, not its behavior, but the word itself, meaning that people tend to believe that it 
makes sense to use and abuse it, relating it to any hate, as a way of avoiding rational argument 
and,  frequently,  excusing  themselves  for  their  own  immoral  and  illegal  behaviour.  Indeed, 
terrorism is a term too subjective and too challenged to capture a phenomenon in a universal and 
objective  way,  especially  since  many  players  on  the  international  stage  resort  to  violence to 
achieve political ends. It is also imperative to recognize our interests and strategic objectives 
involved in any construction on the terrorist phenomenon.  
All these issues, challenges and weaknesses support the accuracy, rigor and objectivity of 
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